Naval War College Review

Volume 25
Number 1 *January 1972*

Article 12

1972

The Naval Academy Illustrated History of the United States Navy

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of his model to hypothetical U.S. requirements in the 1970's and 1980's. He demonstrates that construction must be determined as a function of present force levels, the age at which current units will be considered obsolete, and the time at which the new desired force levels are to be achieved. The rate of ship construction depends not only upon naval planners, but on the vagaries of congressional budgetary politics. Such politics not only fix monetary restraints upon the planner, they also may cause imbalances in planned force ratios since it is often easier politically to fund one type of weapons system than another.

Despite the vagaries of the future, Mr. Kuzmack contends that it is essential that present planners have a systematic approach for programing future construction needs. The development and use of a systematic model should enable the Navy to be more efficient in its use of construction funds and will provide shipbuilders with some ability to forecast future facility requirements.

Carefully developing and adhering to his methodology, the author has presented a useful intellectual exercise for planners to emulate. As such, it is a welcome addition to a rather limited, but important, body of literature—scholarly analyses of practical naval problems. The value of this paper lies in the exposition of the model rather than in the illustrative analysis which the author provides. By carefully defining the mission to be accomplished, naval planners could determine what means are required and in what manner these means can be most rationally provided.

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Potter, E.B. *The Naval Academy Illustrated History of the United States Navy.* New York: Crowell, 1971. 299p.

In his latest work, E.B. Potter, Professor of Naval History at the U.S. Naval Academy and editor of *Seapower: a Naval History,* has presented an illustrated narrative of major battles and wartime actions from "George Washington's Navy" to the U.S. Navy in Vietnam. Enhanced by more than 230 illustrations, maps, and diagrams, the *Illustrated History* is essentially a narrative which has been dramatized by the addition of pictorial material. Employing many well-known, contemporary, and modern scenes of historic events, the author clearly and accurately describes the major episodes of American naval history.

Throughout the text the emphasis is upon tactics, dramatic incidents, and interesting anecdotes of action. Behind the frieze of great leaders and stirring events, Potter has broadly sketched the prominent strategic, diplomatic, and technological developments. He has neither attempted to fathom the art of naval warfare nor to view the Navy within a broad context. The reader finds little information on the development of strategical or tactical theory, the growth and refinement of naval administration, the place of the Navy in American society, or the complex interrelationship between land, sea, and air power. There are no footnotes, and there is no bibliography. More than one third of the book is devoted to World War II. Thus, it is a popular work for a broad, general audience rather than a professional text.

The advanced student of naval history will find several generalizations with which he may not fully agree. As an example, Potter summarizes the end of the Continental Navy by noting that after the Treaty of Paris in 1783, "*Alliance* was the only vessel still in commission. . . . None were added, for the war had demonstrated that any fleet the United States was capable of producing would achieve little of consequence when opposed to a first class

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naval power." Some historians have attributed the American victory to Britain's inability to simultaneously cope with a multinational threat in several parts of the globe. In addition, they point out the administrative weakness of the Royal Navy, the failure of diplomacy, and the unprecedented intrusion of politics into British strategic thinking. However true these points may be, one can still not overlook the place of the colonists in their own war. The Continental maritime effort was not without its value. Certainly, the history of the Continental Navy was marred by inept direction. British naval power was not directly damaged by the Americans, and her commerce was not totally disrupted. The known existence of a Continental naval force, along with raiding by the Continental Navy, the State navies, and American privateers, did have its psychological effect. The rebelling colonists were able to maintain maritime communication with Europe, to divert a portion of British supplies for their own purposes, and to display the American flag abroad where it could attest to the existence of a new nation. Potter's conclusion seems even less justified when one notes the importance of the Continental Navy's experience to the genesis of the new U.S. Navy.

In another example, from the opposite end of the book, the author explains the change in the Navy's professional leadership at the outbreak of World War II. Potter states that "because Admiral King's responsibilities were found to overlap those of Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), President Roosevelt, in March 1942, sent Stark to London as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and appointed King CNO as well as COMINCH." One can readily agree that this was the reason for combining the two offices, but it appears as a misleading statement when viewed outside the context of administrative history. When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the command of the U.S. Fleet was held by three officers: Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet. The senior of these had the collateral duty of Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet (CINCUS, abbreviated COMINCH after 1941). The U.S. Fleet was an administrative organization for training purposes. CINCUS exercised his authority only when two or more fleets were operating together and when prescribing standards for training afloat. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt issued an Executive order which provided that COMINCH was to exercise supreme command of the operating forces from headquarters in Washington. Adm. E.J. King was appointed to this post on 20 December 1941. By this action, the President removed the U.S. Fleet from the authority of the CNO and enhanced the position of COMINCH by giving him broader powers and direct access to SECNAV and the President. Centralized command of most of the forces afloat was, thus, brought to the Navy Department, where it could meld with the planning and logistics functions of the CNO and the Bureau Chiefs. When Admiral King became both CNO and COMINCH in March 1942, a single person was finally given the authority to direct the fleet and to control the bureaus. The relief of Admiral Stark resulted from more than a mere overlapping of authority. As Fleet Admiral King noted in his autobiography, the demotion of Stark to CINCUSNAVEUR was a matter of political expediency resulting directly from the Pearl Harbor controversy.

Potter's *Illustrated History* is a basically sound and accurate work, although it does contain generalizations that other historians will want modified. This handsomely printed and well laid out book is a valuable contribution in the effort to bring the Navy's past to a larger public. Remembering that it is an

illustrated narrative rather than a pictorial history, the book is recommended for those who have had limited exposure to naval history and for others who would find useful an attractive and general treatment of the major episodes in Ameriean naval history.

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Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a Souldier perfect in the Art Military, how great soever his practical knowledge may be.

George Monk (Duke of Albemarle): Observations Upon Military & Political Affairs, 1671